Regional Dominance and Strategic Non-Alignment: A Multi-Tier Theory of Candidate Alignment in Taiwan, 1994–2024

SSRN Preprint

Our new SSRN preprint is out: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5792422

We develop a multi-tier theory of candidate alignment in unitary systems, showing that local candidates often respond to regional dominance, not just national party strength. Using original data on 8,998 regional legislative candidates in Taiwan (1994–2024), we explain when candidates align with dominant parties and when they instead pursue independent non-alignment.

Authors

Abstract

This article revisits the assumption that local candidates align with nationally dominant parties to secure resources for their regions and advance their political careers. We propose a multi-tier theory of candidate alignment in unitary systems that foregrounds the strategic importance of regionally dominant parties and specifies the conditions under which candidates reject alignment altogether. Local candidates are more likely to align with regionally dominant parties than nationally dominant parties, except when representing cohesive constituencies which strongly oppose the regional ruling party. In these settings, opposition candidates opt for independent non-alignment as a partisan hedging strategy rather than as fatigue with party polarization. We evaluate these claims with an original dataset of 8,998 regional legislative candidates in Taiwan between 1994 and 2024. Multinomial logistic regression analysis reveals that Taiwan’s non-indigenous candidates consistently align with regionally dominant parties, whereas indigenous candidates avoid aligning with the Democratic Progressive Party, preferring independent non-alignment when it is regionally dominant.

Data

Article data drawn from the Taiwan Legislative Leaders dataset.

The Taiwan Legislative Leaders dataset was queried from the Taiwan Politics Integrated Database

Related Projects

This article forms part of a broader project on Regional Parties and Politicians in Taiwan and South Korea and is guided by the Political Networks and Organizations framework.

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), Taiwan, under Project No. [NSTC-113-2410-H-004-002-MY2].